This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions (c and χ not decreasing in time). We use the dynamic programming principle and viscosity solutions approach to show existence and uniqueness of a solution for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential equation (PDE) of the game. We prove that the upper and lower value functions coincide.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the state process of the stochastic differential game, defined as the solution of the following stochastic equation: χ are not decreasing in time). Therefore the main objective of our work, and this is the novelty of the paper is to characterize the value function as the only solution in viscosity sense of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential equation (PDE) for the finite horizon problem.
We prove the lower and the upper value functions of stochastic differential game satisfy the dynamic programming principle. We show that the HJBI equation associated to the stochastic differential game, which turns out to be the same for the two value functions because the two players cannot act simultaneously on the system, is the unique solution of the following system:
Where L is the second-order local operator, and the nonlocal operators H This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the problem and we give the related definitions. In Section 3, we shall introduce the stochastic differential game problem and give some preliminary results of the lower and the upper value functions of stochastic differential game. Further we provide some estimate for the optimal strategy of problem which in combination with the dynamic programming principle plays a crucial role in the proof of existence the value functions. In Section 4, we prove the dynamic programming principle. Further, we show the existence and continuity of the lower and the upper value functions. Section 5, is devoted to the connection between the zero sum stochastic differential game problem and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation.
In Section 6, we show that the solution of HJBI is unique in the subclass of bounded continuous functions. Further, the upper and the lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value.
Assumptions and formulation of the problem
Throughout this paper T (resp. n, d) is a fixed real (resp. integers) positive numbers.
Let us assume the following assumptions: where k > 0.
Moreover, c(t, ξ 1 + ξ 2 ) ≤ c(t, ξ 1 ) + c(t, ξ 2 ) (2.4) χ(t, η 1 + η 2 ) ≤ χ(t, η 1 ) + χ(t, η 2 ) (2.5)
for every t ∈ [0, T ], ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ U and η 1 , η 2 ∈ V.
(H4) (no terminal impulse). For any x ∈ R n , η ∈ V and ξ ∈ U
U and V are two convex cones of R n with U ⊂ V.
Remark 1
The above assumptions (2.4) and (2.5) ensures that multiple impulses occurring at the same time are suboptimal. ✷
We now consider the HJBI equation:
Where L is the second-order local operator
and the nonlocal operators H c sup and H χ inf are given by
The main objective of this paper is to focus on the existence and uniqueness of the solution in viscosity sense of (2.7) whose definition is:
for any x ∈ R n . The V is called:
is a local maximum of V − φ, we have:
(ii) A viscosity supersolution of (2.7) if for any (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and any function
, such that is (t 0 , x 0 ) a local minimum of V − φ, we have:
(2.9) (iii) A viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity supersolution and subsolution. ✷ There is an equivalent formulation of this definition (see e.g. [7] ) which we give because it will be useful later. So firstly, we define the notions of superjet and subjet of a continuous function V .
an element of (0, T ) × R n and finally S n the set of n × n symmetric matrices. We denote by J 2,+ V (t, x) (resp. J 2,− V (t, x)), the superjets (resp. the subjets) of V at (t, x), the set of triples (p, q, X) ∈ R × R n × S n such that:
resp.
Note that if φ − V has a local maximum (resp. minimum) at (t, x), then we obviously have:
We now give an equivalent definition of a viscosity solution of HJBI equation(2.7):
Definition 3 Let V be a continuous function defined on [0, T ]×R n and such that V (T, x) = g(x) for any x ∈ R n . Then V is a viscosity supersolution (resp., subsolution) to the HJBI equation (2.7) if and only if for every
It is called a viscosity solution it is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution. ✷
As pointed out previously we will show that system (2.7) has a unique solution in viscosity sense. This system is the deterministic version of the stochastic differential game problem will describe briefly in the next section.
3 The stochastic differential game problem
Setting of the problem
Let (Ω, F , P) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a standard d-dimensional
Brownian motion W = (W t ) t≤T , whose natural filtration is (F 0 t := σ{W s ; s ≤ t}) 0≤t≤T . We denote by F = (F t ) t≤T the completed filtration of (F 0 t ) t≤T with the P-null sets of F . We are given two convex cones U and V of R n , with V ⊂ U. We call U and V the spaces of controle actions. We begin by introducing the concept of impulse control.
, the action times, is a sequence of F-stopping times, valued in
(ii) (ξ m ) m (resp., (η l ) l ), the actions, is a sequence of U-valued (resp, V-valued) random variables, where each ξ m (resp., η l ) is F τm -measurable (resp., F ρ l -measurable).
Let t ∈ [0, T ] be the initial time of the game and x ∈ R n the initial state. Then, given the impulse controls u and v on [t, T ], the state process of the stochastic differential game is defined as the solution to the following stochastic equation:
Then, under (H1), the stochastic differential equation (3.1) admits a unique solution
The gain functional for player I (resp., cost functional for player II) is given by
f is the running gain and g is the payoff. The function c is the cost function for player I
and is a gain function for player II, meaning that when player I performs an action he/she has to pay a cost, resulting in a gain for player II. Analogously, χ is the cost function for player II and is a gain function for player I. 
µ t,τ is the number of impulses up to time τ , i.e.,
Definition 6 (Admissible impulse control). An admissible impulse control u for player I (resp., v for player II) on [t, T ] ⊂ R + , is an impulse control for player I (resp., II) on
with a finite average number of impulses, i.e.,
The set of all admissible impulse controls for player I (resp., II) on [t, T ] is denoted by U t,T (resp., V t,T ).
Next, we adopt the notion of Control identification and nonanticipative strategy.
Definition 7 (Control identification)
.
Definition 8 (nonanticipative strategy). The nonanticipative strategy set A t,T for player I is the collection of all nonanticipative maps α from V t,T to U t,T , i.e for any [t, T ]-valued F-stopping times τ and any
Analogously, the nonanticipative strategy set B t,T for player II is the collection of all nonanticipative maps β from U t,T to V t,T .
We are now ready to introduce the upper and lower values of the game:
and
The maps V − and V + are called the lower value and the upper value of the game, respectively. The game is said to admit a value if
The HJBI equation associated to the stochastic differential game, which turns out to be the same for the two value functions because the two players cannot act simultaneously on the system, is given by (2.7).
Remark 2
The infinite product l≥1 1 1 {τm =ρ l } in (3.1) means that when the two players act together on the system, we take into account only the action of player II. When take into account only the action of player I instead of player II. Then, using arguments analogous to those presented in the sections below, it can be proved that, with this assumption, the corresponding HJBI equation is given by
(3.7)
Preliminary results
In this section we present some properties of the lower and upper value functions of our differential game.
We begin by the following lemma, which is concerned with the continuous dependence of X t,x,u,v with respect to x.
Lemma 1 Under assumption (H1) there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for every
Next, in the following proposition, we prove that the two value functions are bounded.
Theorem 1 Under the standing assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), the lower and upper
value functions are bounded.
P roof : We make the proof only for the lower value function V − , the other case being analogous.
Using the definition of lower value function, we have,
where v 0 is the control with no impulses. Let ǫ > 0, then there exists a strategy u ǫ ∈ U t,T such that
Since the cost c(τ ǫ m , ξ ǫ m ) are non negative functions, then we have
Therefore we find, using also the boundedness of f and g, that there exists a constant
In a similar way we can prove that there exists a constant C > 0 such that
from which we deduce the thesis. ✷
We are now giving some properties of nearly nearly optimal strategies.
Proposition 1 Let u ∈ U t,T and v ∈ V t,T be a nearly optimal strategies composed of
There exists a positive constant C > 0 which does not depend on t and x such that:
We denote by U t,T and V t,T the set which satisfies the conditions (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. Similarly, by A t,T and B t,T the sets that contain all the nonanticipative strategies with values in U t,T and V t,T , respectively. P roof . Let us choose a nearly optimal strategy u ∈ U t,T composed of impulse control
Since V − , f and g are bounded, then we have
Next we show (3.10). Taking into account that c(τ, ξ)
we obtain:
Finally taking into account k > 0, we obtain the desired result.
The other case being analogous. ✷ Corollary 1 Under the standing assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3),
In the following proposition, using Lemma 1, we prove that the lower and upper value functions are continuous in the state variable, together with the gain functional.
Proposition 2 The gain functional, lower and upper value functions are continuous in
x.
P roof. It is enough to show that the conclusion holds for the gain functional J.
From Lemma 1 and continuity of f and g in x we get the thesis. ✷ 4 The value functions
Dynamic Programming Principle
In this section we present the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for the stochastic differential game. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([6], Lemma 3.3). The lower and upper value functions are given by
for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , whereŪ t,T andV t,T contain all the impulse controls in U t,T and V t,T , respectively, which have no impulses at time t. Similarly,Ā t,T andB t,T are subsets of A t,T and B t,T , respectively. In particular, they contain all the nonanticipative strategies with values inŪ t,T andV t,T , respectively.
Theorem 2 Under assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), given
and each family of
) ,
where
and V * (resp., V * ) its lower (resp. upper) semicontinuous envelope defined by:
P roof . We prove the dynamic programming principle only for V − , the other case being analogous.
Let ǫ > 0 and consider an arbitrary function φ : [0, T ] × R n −→ R such that φ continuous, bounded from above and V − ≤ φ. 
for all y ′ ∈ B i (y) and v ∈V t i ,T .
Therefore, since the family {B i (y) : y ∈ R n } forms an open cover of R n , there exists a sequence (y j ) j≥1 in R n such that {B i (y j )} j≥1 is a countable subcover of R n . We set
We can now define, for i still being fixed, a measurable partition (A i j ) j≥1 by
j , the inequalities (4.7) and (4.8) yield that
Now, let (u, β) ∈ U t,T × B t,T be arbitrary and set τ = τ β(u),u . Fix an integer k ≥ 1, we now focus on (t i ) 1≤i≤k . We may assume that t 1 < t 2 < ... < t k , by eliminating and relabeling some of the t i . We define the F Since the t i are distinct and
We construct the strategy β k by
(4.10)
We deduce via (4.9) that
by dominated convergence and Corollary 1. Moreover, monotone convergence yields
) .
Therefore, we deduce the existence of an integer k 0 ≥ 1 such that
Let a sequence of continuous functions (φ n ) n such that φ n ≥ (V − ) * for all n ≥ 1 and such that φ n converges pointwise to (V − ) * . Set ϕ N := max n≥N φ n for N ≥ 1 and observe that the sequence (ϕ N ) N is decreasing and converges pointwise to (V − ) * . By the monotone convergence theorem, we then obtain:
Therefore, we have
(4.13)
As β and ǫ are arbitrary then sending ǫ → 0, and take infimums in right-hand side of (4.13), to obtain:
(4.14)
In a similar way we can prove the reverse inequality, hence deducing the thesis. ✷
Continuity of value functions in time
In this section we prove the continuity of lower value function and upper value function in t .
First, we know that any stopping time τ can be approximated by a sequence of rational Theorem 3 The lower and upper value functions are continuous in t.
P roof. We make the proof only for V − , the other case being analogous.
First let us show that V − is lower semi-continuous.
Recall the characterization of dynamical programming principle that reads as
Fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0, and we assume that t < t ′ . Pick β ǫ ∈ B t,T such that
where u ∈ U t,T will be chosen later. On the other hand, pick u ǫ ∈ U t ′ ,T such that
We note that, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
Also, taking the limit as t → t ′ , and using the uniform continuity of f , g and χ to obtain:
As n and ǫ are arbitrary then sending ǫ → 0 and n → +∞, to obtain:
Therefore V − is lower semi-continuous.
Now we show that V − is upper semi-continuous.
Fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0, and we assume that t < t ′ .
Pick u ǫ ∈ U t,T such that
where β ∈ B t,T will be chosen later. On the other hand, pick β ǫ belongs toB t ′ ,T such that
Also, taking the limit as t → t ′ , and using the uniform continuity of f , g and c to obtain: lim sup
Therefore V − is upper semi-continuous. We then proved that V − is continuous in t. ✷
Corollary 2
The lower (resp,. upper) value functions are continuous on
. As a consequence, V − (resp,. V + ) satisfies the classical dynamic programming principle: given 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , x ∈ R n , and each family of
we have 17) and
(4.18)
5 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs Equation
In this section we prove that the two value functions are viscosity solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7) associated to the stochastic differential game. We begin with the following Proposition.
Proposition 3
The lower and upper value functions satisfy the following properties:
for all t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R n ,
P roof . We make the proof only for V − , the other case being analogous.
from which we deduce that the following inequality holds:
(ii) the proof proceeds by a case distinction, for τ = t in dynamic programming principle, and the suboptimality of multiple impulses at the same time (Assumptions (2.4) and (2.5)) we have
As a consequence we have
Now we prove that the two value functions satisfy in the viscosity sense.
Theorem 4
The lower and upper value functions are viscosity solutions to the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7).
P roof. We give the proof for the lower value function V − , the other case being analogous.
First, we prove the supersolution property. Suppose V − − φ achieves a local minimum in
. We have by Proposition 3,
then we are done. Now suppose
we prove by contradiction that
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have − ∂φ ∂t
Thanks to Proposition 3, we have 5) which is the supersolution property. The subsolution property is proved analogously.
✷
Now we give an equivalent of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7). We consider the new function Γ given by the classical change of variable Γ(t, x) = exp(t)V (t, x),
A second property is given by the:
Proposition 4 V is a viscosity solution of (2.7) if and only if Γ is a viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation
The terminal condition for Γ is: Γ(T, x) = exp(T )g(x) in R n .
6 Uniqueness of the solution of Hamilton-JacobiBellman-Isaacs equation
In this section we deal with the issue of uniqueness of the solution of system (2.7) and to do so. We need to impose additional assumption of cost functions (H6) There exists a function h :
for every ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ U, and η, η 1 , η 2 ∈ V.
To prove uniqueness viscosity solution to the HJBI equation ( .7), respectively. Let
Then for every ǫ > 0, there existsx ∈ R n and δ > 0 such that
P roof : Fix ǫ > 0, We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1 Let (6.3) hold. Then for α 1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists η 0 ∈ V such that
Then, we observe that
Thus, by taking α 1 sufficiently small and (6.1), we get
On the other hand, its easy to check that
Step 2 Now, suppose that (6.4) holds at (t 0 , x 0 ), then for α 2 ∈ (0, 1), there exists
Then, we have
By taking α 2 sufficiently small and (6.2), we can show that
, we take (t 0 ,x) := (t 0 , x 0 + ξ 0 ). Otherwise we can proceed as in Step 1 and we find η 0 ∈ V such that
On the other hand, we have
Thus, by (6.2), we get
Therefore we take (t 0 ,x) := (t 0 , x 0 + ξ 0 + η 0 ).
Step 3 We can find α > 0 such that
Thus, by uniform continuity of U, V, c, and χ we have
in which u, v, h and w are the modulus of continuity of U, V, c and χ respectively. Therefore, there exists δ > 0 such that Proof. We will show by contradiction that if U and V is a subsolution and a supersolution respectively for (5.6), then U ≤ V. Therefore if we have two solutions of (5.6) then they are obviously equal. Actually for some R > 0 (large enough) suppose there exists
Step 1. Using Lemma 3, we can find (t,x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and δ such that
and 8) for all (t, x) ∈ I ×B(x, δ), where I :
For a small ǫ, β, θ > 0, let us define:
Φ ǫ (t, x, y) = U(t, x) − V (t, y) − 1 2ǫ |x − y| 2 − θ(|x − x 0 | 4 + |y − x 0 | 4 )
−β(t − t 0 ) 2 . (6.9)
By the boundedness of U and V , that there exists a (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) ∈ I ×B(x, δ) ×B(x, δ), attaining the maximum of Φ ǫ on I ×B(x, δ) ×B(x, δ).
On the other hand, from 2Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) ≥ Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , x ǫ ) + Φ ǫ (t ǫ , y ǫ , y ǫ ), we have 1 2ǫ |x ǫ − y ǫ | 2 ≤ (U(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − U(t ǫ , y ǫ )) + (V (t ǫ , x ǫ ) − V (t ǫ , y ǫ )), (6.10) and consequently 1 2ǫ |x ǫ − y ǫ | 2 is bounded, and as ǫ → 0, |x ǫ − y ǫ | → 0. Since U and V are uniformly continuous on I ×B(x, δ), then 1 2ǫ |x ǫ − y ǫ | 2 → 0 as ǫ → 0.
Since Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) ≥ Φ ǫ (t 0 , x 0 , x 0 ), we have U(t 0 , x 0 ) − V (t 0 , x 0 ) ≤ Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) ≤ U(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − V (t ǫ , y ǫ ), (6.11) it follow from the continuity of U and V that, up to a subsequence, (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) → (t 0 , x 0 , x 0 ) θ(|x ǫ − x 0 | 4 + |y ǫ − x 0 | 4 ) → 0 U(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − V (t ǫ , y ǫ ) → U(t 0 , x 0 ) − V (t 0 , x 0 ). (6.12) Next, since x 0 ∈B(x, δ) then, for ǫ small enough and at least for a subsequence which we still index by ǫ, we obtain V (t ǫ , y ǫ ) <H χ inf V (t ǫ , y ǫ ), U(t ǫ , x ǫ ) >H c sup U(t ǫ , x ǫ ). (6.13)
Step 2. We now show that t ǫ < T. Actually if t ǫ = T then, which yields a contradiction and we have t ǫ ∈ [0, T ).
Step 3 Now, from (H1), (6.16) and (6.21) we get:
And finally,
So that by plugging into (6.19) we obtain:
−2β(t ǫ − t 0 ) + U(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − V (t ǫ , y ǫ ) ≤ C ǫ |x ǫ − y ǫ | 2 + Cθ(1 + |x ǫ | 2 + |y ǫ | 2 ) + C ǫ |x ǫ − y ǫ | 2 +Cθ(1 + |x ǫ ||x ǫ − x 0 | 3 + |y ǫ ||y ǫ − x 0 | 3 ) + exp(t ǫ )f (t ǫ , x ǫ ) − exp(t ǫ )f (t ǫ , y ǫ ). (6.22) By sending ǫ → 0, β → 0, θ → 0, and taking into account of the continuity of f , we obtain η ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. The proof of Theorem 5 is now complete. ✷
Corollary 3
The lower and upper value functions coincide, and the value function of the stochastic differential game is given by V (t, x) := V − (t, x) = V + (t, x) for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n .
